Introduction

2016 feature film Bacchus
Lady by E J-Yong brought light to the concerning new social phenomena
in South Korea, elder poverty. The shock of the film and its stoic tale that
followed alienated individuals in Korean society effectively brought the
problem of elder poverty into mainstream conversation. Elder poverty is most
prevalent in South Korea than in any other Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) nation in the past three decades. In 2017,
the elder poverty rate in South Korea hit 43.8 percent (OECD 2020), meaning
that 1 in 2 elders were experiencing poverty in South Korea. The issue of elder
poverty is crucial in South Korea as the country enters into old age society
where elders form about 14% of the population. As the country becomes more
elder dependent, the high rate of elder poverty raises various problems for
South Korean society. Income disparity, lack of good pension programs, and
change in family structure are main causes of elder poverty in South Korea.
This essay argues that the rapid economic development under authoritarian
government and changes in Confucian traditions results in the old age poverty
phenomenon in South Korea.

Post-War Economic Development under Authoritarian
Government 

After the Korean war
(1950-53), South Korea was the most impoverished nation in the world, suffering
from the aftermaths of colonialism and the national divide. Under the
authoritarian government, South Korea grew rapidly and prosperously within just
a couple of decades that by the late 1980’s, they were the 10th largest economy
in the world. Many scholars call this rapid, or compressed economic
growth.  During the rapid economic
growth, South Korea became one of the powerhouses of industrial forces in Asia
and actively participated in the world economy. Under the Park Chung Hee
government, South Korea changed its economic policy to focus on an export-led
economy and reaped many financial benefits (Korea: Old and New a New History,
405). Park’s economic development plan focused on foreign aid like the USA,
Japan, foreign opportunities, and a few business conglomerates to help build
the country’s wealth. With monetary aid and loans from the USA and Japan, South
Korea jumped into the international export market and kickstarted the economic
development. For example, Carter J. Eckert et al states, “Between 1953 to
1962 the American funds financed 70% of South Korea’s imports and accounted for
nearly 80% of total fixed capital formation, mainly in the areas of transportation,
manufacturing and electric power” (397). This aid helped create a modern
urban infrastructure in Korea. 

However, this dependency and
compressed development created unstable economic grounding for South Korea because
of overdependency on foreign capital, international relations, and the country’s
core elite class known as chaebol. Wealth and opportunities were not
distributed equally and failed to spread across the Korean population. The
country expensed the citizen’s labour in the global market and created harsh
working conditions while justifying its sacrifice for the development of the
nation whilst strongly enforced Confucian and nationalist ideals (406). Many
middle-class and working-class populations fell behind in this compressed
economic development, creating an even bigger wealth inequality between South
Korean classes. Furthermore, as the country focused solely on an export-led
economy, many private sectors like agriculture fell behind. 

In the 1970s, agriculture
took up 47% of the GDP in South Korea, and by the 1980’s it fell to 29%. The
decline in agricultural share in GDP happened as fast and as compressed as the
speed of economic development. OECD 1999 states, ” Its average percentage
decrease was slightly above 4 percent per annum during the 1970s and 1980s and
accelerated to 5 percent in the first half of the 1990” (29).
However, due to technological development, agricultural production increased
and resulted in a steeper agricultural employment decline. From the 1960s to
1970, more than 50 percent decline could be observed in the agricultural
employment rate, meaning approximately 2.5 million South Koreans lost their
jobs or transitioned out of the agricultural labour field (29). By 1997, people
over the age of 50 covered about 47 percent of the agricultural population,
while other age demographic faced a decline in its share (34). Thus, the older
working population was alienated from income-generating activities during the
authoritarian governments’ economic development plan as the agricultural
industry cut short in participating in the nation’s GDP. 

This alienation comes to
haunt them decades later in the form of elder poverty because the short forms
of gaining income for the older generation excluded them from the labour force
and wealth generation. When observing the multidimensional poverty rate among
the three big Asian economic powerhouses: China, Japan and South Korea, Nozaki
and Oshio’s study on Multidimensional Poverty and Perceived Happiness
observes that income deprivation is the key contributor to elder poverty in all
three countries. Using data from 2012 OECD, the authors were able to find that
South Korea has the highest income deprivation rate among the three countries
and the most significant age difference in poverty, hinting that elder poverty
is most prevalent in South Korea (285).  

The older age demographic
fell behind in the compressed economic development as the authoritarian government’s
economic development plan focused purely on nations development and failed to
extend care to the ones alienated in this plan. Some may argue that the
government did extend care and social welfare and subsidies between the periods
1945-1988. These subsidies were offered to generally three different groups:
families in social welfare institutions, families without breadwinners, and
families of soldiers and policemen who had died at work (Lee, 47). State
efforts were made to regulate childcare and eldercare facilities and focused on
children under 13, elders aged over 65, pregnant women, and the disabled
through the Chosun Poor Law and Protection of Minimum Living Standards act
(47). However, little care was given to the middle class and working-class ageing
population who would have been the working population back then. It was not
until 1988, the last stretch of the authoritarian state rule, that the state
introduced a public pension program called National Pension Scheme, extending
care to the working population as well (Lee, Ku, and Shon, 507); but by then
the cleavage between the economic classes in South Korea was already too great.
The program launched too late for the authoritarian era’s working population to
reap benefits in their 60’s. Lee, Ku and Shon attribute the underdevelopment of
public pension programs to the modern-day problem of elder poverty. By 2013
only about 31.9 percent of elders benefited from this pension program, but
since it was also a contributory insurance scheme that provides
earnings-related benefits, it did not help relieve the elder poverty rate in
South Korea (507). Instead, the government emphasized the patriarchal norms and
Confucian ideals and the role of filial piety to transfer the responsibility of
elder support to their children. 

Change in Confucian Korea

Changes in family structures
also contributed to the increasing elder poverty rate. Traditionally South
Korea follows a Confucian family structure, closely following patriarchal
ideals and the role of filial piety. Children’s expected role in adulthood is
to support their elderly parents for all that their parents have done when
raising them. Traditional patriarchal ideals have put this responsibility on
the eldest son, as they grow up with most benefits and opportunities, like
education. However, these Confucian traditions and traditional arrangements of
family provisions are increasingly breaking down. Less adult children live with
their parents, and many have denied the long-standing familial traditions in
modern times and other Confucian traditions. Many young adults in the 1980’s
have emigrated from South Korea, fleeing from the authoritarian regime and
looking for better future opportunities abroad, thus abandoning their familial
duties. Eighty percent of older people lived with their child in 1980, but the
proportion decreased to 49 percent in 2000, showing a dramatic breaking down in
traditional family elder support (qtd by Kim and Cook, 955). The increase in
the elder divorce rate also adds to the recent change in family structures in
South Korea that disrupts the Confucian traditions. A gap is found between traditional
Confucian expectations and familial reality as the current adult generation in
South Korea continue to deny traditional roles in family structure. 

While the traditional family
structures are breaking down there is still a heavy emphasis on adult children’s
role in providing economic support for their elderly parents. Because of the
decline in cohabitation between elders and their adult children, financial
transfers from non-co-resident children have been crucial to the elder’s
economic well-being (957). Elders rely on private transfers from their adult
children to relieve potential poverty, and this counted for 72% of total income
for people aged 60 or older in 1980, but the rate dropped to 31% in 2003 (qtd,
955). Although there is a drop in the rate of private financial transfers
between adult children and parents, this financial transfer is incredibly
crucial in relieving elder poverty, as Kim and Cook observe. In the study, they
observed that “Child-to-parent financial transfers not only reduce poverty
among older people but also reduce income inequality in the population”
(968) as 26.5 percent of the 8.3 billion kW elder poverty gap was filled by
private transfers (968). Kim and Cook also observed that the real poverty rate
in co-resident elders is much lower than the poverty rate in elders with no
co-resident, reinforcing that the breakdown of traditional family structures is
an indispensable factor in elder poverty.  

Conclusion 

       
   South
Korean society has already entered the ageing society stage because of the low
birth rate, and the country is now an elder dependent country instead of
country supporting elders. At the same time, South-Korea has the highest elder
poverty rate out of all the OECD countries. The three significant factors in
elder poverty are income deprivation, poor pension program, and change in
family structures in recent decades. By observing these three significant
factors, the essay explores the faulty legacy of authoritarian governments
compressed economic development, enforcement of nationalist and Confucian
agenda by the state, and change in Confucian ideologies in the younger
generation, resulting in elder poverty. To reduce elder poverty, we must look
for new ways to support the elder in a sustainable way that does not depend on
the tradition of Confucianism and family roles. Instead, South Korean society
needs effective pension programs and programs to help raise the elderly
population’s participation in society. Only then, can South Korea adjust
to this shift and resolve issues following elder poverty.

Works Cited

“Economic Development in
Historical Perspective 1945-1990.” Korea, Old and New a History, by
Carter J. Eckert et al., Ilchokak, 1990, pp. 389–418.

“Inequality - Poverty Rate -
OECD Data.” TheOECD, data.oecd.org/inequality/poverty-rate.htm.

Kim, Erin Hye-Won, and Philip
J. Cook. “The Continuing Importance of Children in Relieving Elder Poverty:
Evidence from Korea.” Ageing and Society, vol. 31, no. 6, 2011, pp.
953–976., doi:10.1017/s0144686x10001030.

Lee, Dayoon. “The Evolution of
Family Policy in South Korea: From Confucian Familism to Neo-Familism.” Asian
Social Work and Policy Review, vol. 12, no. 1, 29 Dec. 2017, pp. 46–53.,
doi:10.1111/aswp.12137.

Lee, Seungho, et al. “The
Effects of Old-Age Public Transfer on the Well-Being of Older Adults: The Case
of Social Pension in South Korea .” J Gerontol B Psychol Sci Soc Sci,
vol. 74, no. No. 3, ser. 506-515, 29 July 2017, pp. 506–515. 506-515,
doi:10.1093/geronb/gbx104.

Nozaki, Kayo, and Takashi
Oshio. “Multidimensional Poverty and Perceived Happiness: Evidence from China,
Japan and Korea*.” Asian Economic Journal, vol. 30, no. No. 3, 2016, pp.
275–293., doi:10.1111/asej.12094.

“OECD Review of Agricultural
Policies: Korea 1999.” OECD Review of Agricultural Policies, 1999,
doi:10.1787/9789264172623-en.